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a b s t r a c t
Revolutionaries and Spies is a game, G(G, r, s, k), played on a graph G between two
teams: one team consists of r revolutionaries, the other consists of s spies. To start, each
revolutionary chooses a vertex as its position. The spies then do the same. (Throughout
the game, there is no restriction on the number of revolutionaries and spies that may be
positioned on any given vertex.) The revolutionaries and spies then alternate moves with
the revolutionaries going first. Tomove, each revolutionary simultaneously chooses to stay
put on its vertex or tomove to an adjacent vertex. The spiesmove in the sameway. The goal
of the revolutionaries is to place kof their teamon somevertex v in such away that the spies
cannot place one of their spies at v in their next move; this is a win for the revolutionaries.
If the spies can prevent this forever, theywin. There is no hidden information; the positions
of all revolutionaries and spies is known to both sides at all times.
We will present a number of basic results as well as the result that if G(Z2, r, s, 2)
is a win for the spies, then s ≥ 6⌊ r8 ⌋. (Here allowable moves in Z2 consist of one-step
horizontal, vertical or diagonal moves.)
© 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Let G be a graph, possibly infinite, and let r, s, k be positive integers. Revolutionaries and Spies, denoted by G(G, r, s, k), is
the following game invented by Beck [1]. G(G, r, s, k) is played between two teams of agents. The first team is a team of r
‘‘revolutionaries’’ and the second a team of s ‘‘spies’’. In round 0, each revolutionary takes a position on some vertex of G and,
afterwards, each spy does the same. There is no restriction on the number of spies or revolutionaries that may be placed on
a vertex at any point in the game. For i ≥ 1, round i begins with each revolutionary moving either to a vertex adjacent to its
current vertex or staying at its current vertex. Round i ends with the spies moving in the same fashion. The revolutionaries
have ameeting of size k at a vertex v if k or more revolutionaries are present at that vertex. A meeting at vertex v is guarded
if a spy is present at v. The revolutionaries win G(G, r, s, k) if they can guarantee an unguarded meeting of size k at the end
of some round after the spies have had onemove to respond. Otherwise, the spies have a strategy to prevent this for all time
andwe say the spies win G(G, r, s, k). Note that when the revolutionaries first form a number of meetings of size k, the spies
have one move to guard them all. If the spies succeed, the game continues; otherwise, the revolutionaries win.
Continuous versions of this problem can also be considered. For example, one could play the game in the plane, where
each agent has the power tomove to points within Euclidean distance 1 from their current position. Or the agentsmaymove
continuously at rates less than or equal to 1. These variants were suggested by Beck [1].
There is a similarity between the moves in Spies and Revolutionaries and Cops and Robbers [4,5]. The latter game is a
pursuit game played by a cop and a robber on a graph G: the cop chooses a vertex, then the robber chooses a vertex, and
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players move alternately starting with the cop. A move consists of either staying at one’s present vertex or moving to an
adjacent vertex; eachmove is seen by both players. The cop wins if he manages to occupy the same vertex as the robber and
the robber wins if he avoids this forever. The graphs on which the cop has a winning strategy have been characterized [4,5].
Definition 1.1. Let G be a graph and let r and k be positive integers. We define σ(G, r, k) to be the minimum value of s such
that the spies win G(G, r, s, k).
We record the following trivial observation.
Lemma 1.2. If G is a graph, then
min

|V (G)|,
 r
k

≤ σ(G, r, k) ≤ min{|V (G)|, r − k+ 1}.
Proof. For the lower bound, observe that the revolutionaries can construct min
|V (G)|,  rkmeetings of size k on distinct
vertices in their firstmove. The spiesmust be able to guard all of thesemeetings. The upper bound is obtained by considering
two separate strategies for the spies. The spies could win by using |V (G)| spies to permanently guard each vertex. The spies
could alsowin by picking r−k+1 revolutionaries to follow, assigning themdistinct spies to stay on their respective positions.
The spies win with this strategy as well, as every meeting of size kwill involve a revolutionary that is being followed. 
This trivial lower bound from Lemma 1.2 is attained on acyclic graphs.
Theorem 1.3. If G is an acyclic graph, then
σ(G, r, k) = min

|V (G)|,
 r
k

.
This theorem was initially proved by one of the authors in an equivalent form in [6]. The proof of Theorem 1.3 will
appear in [3] which covers Revolutionaries and Spies on trees and unicyclic graphs. It would be interesting to characterize
those graphs G for which σ(G, r, k) = min |V (G)|,  rk. By Theorem 2.3 all powers of acyclic graphs are included.
For v,w ∈ V (G), let dG(v,w) be the distance between v and w in G, i.e. the minimum length of an v,w-path in G. If no
such path exists, then let dG(v,w) = +∞. Note dG(v, v) = 0.
Let G and H be graphs. The strong product of G and H , denoted by G  H , is the graph with vertex set V (G)× V (H) such
that vertices (g, h) and (g ′, h′) are adjacent in G  H if and only if (g, h) ≠ (g ′, h′), dG(g, g ′) ≤ 1, and dH(h, h′) ≤ 1. We
denote by Z the graph Gwith V (G) = Z and E(G) = {{i, i+ 1} : i ∈ Z}. For d ≥ 1, let Zd be the d-fold strong product of Z
with itself.
We study Revolutionaries and Spies on Zd. Perhaps one of the most basic (yet nontrivial) quantities to study is the
threshold σ(Zd, r, 2).
Theorem 1.4. If d is an integer with d ≥ 2, then σ(Zd, r, 2) ≥ 6  r8.
Note that Lemma 1.2 only implies σ(Zd, r, 2) ≥  r2. We conjecture that σ(Zd, r, 2) = r − 2 for d ≥ 2.
While this manuscript was under review the authors learned of the work in progress of several other authors.
Theorem 1.3 has been generalized in [3] to the case of unicyclic graphs G: σ(G, r, k) ∈  rk ,  rk and furthermore if
k - r , then σ(G, r, k) =  rk if and only if ℓ ≤ max  rk− t + 2, 3where ℓ is the length of the cycle and t = |V (G)| − ℓ.
Revolutionaries and Spies has now been studied on interval graphs, hypercubes, random graphs, complete multipartite
graphs, and also on a common generalization of trees and graphs with a dominating vertex [2].
The organization of the paper is as follows: we present a number of basic definitions and results in Section 2 and then
prove Theorem 1.4 in Section 3.
2. Basic results
Note that if r ′, r, k′, and k are integers with r ′ ≥ r ≥ 1 and k′ ≥ k ≥ 1, then σ(G, r ′, k) ≥ σ(G, r, k) and
σ(G, r, k′) ≤ σ(G, r, k). For example, if G(G, r ′, s, k) is a win for the spies, then so is G(G, r, s, k): the spies use their winning
strategy in G(G, r ′, s, k) to play G(G, r, s, k) as if there were an additional r ′ − r revolutionaries fixed on some vertex.
Lemma 2.1. Let k =ci=1 ki and r =ci=1 ri, where all quantities are positive integers. For any graph G,
σ(G, r, k− c + 1) ≤
c
i=1
σ(G, ri, ki).
Proof. Let si = σ(G, ki, ri) for 1 ≤ i ≤ c , and set s = ci=1 si. We claim G(G, r, s, k − c + 1) is a win for the spies. The
spies divide the revolutionaries into c disjoint groups Ri, 1 ≤ i ≤ c , where Ri consists of ri revolutionaries. The spies are also
divided into disjoint groups Si, 1 ≤ i ≤ c , where Si consists of si spies. For 1 ≤ i ≤ c the spies simultaneously use group Si
to prevent a meeting of size ki amongst the revolutionaries in group Ri. The largest possible unguarded meeting under this
strategy is
c
i=1(ki − 1) = k− c. 
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Note that if r, a, k are positive integers, then Lemma 2.1 implies the three inequalities σ(G, r + a, k + a) ≤
σ(G, r, k), σ (G, r + a, k) ≤ σ(G, r, k)+ a, and σ(G, ar, ak) ≤ aσ(G, r, k).
Lemma 2.2. If G is a graph and a is a positive integer, then σ(G, ar, ak) ≥ σ(G, r, k).
Proof. Let s = σ(G, ar, ak). We claim that G(G, r, s, k) is a win for the spies. The spies identify each revolutionary with
a group of a revolutionaries sharing the same position and then follow their winning strategy in G(G, ar, s, ak). The spies
prevent a meeting of size k in G(G, r, s, k) in this way because the corresponding groups will form a meeting of size ak in
G(G, ar, s, ak). 
If G is a graph, the nth power of G is the graph Gn with V (Gn) = V (G) and E(Gn) = {{v,w} : 0 < dG(v,w) ≤ n}.
Theorem 2.3. If G is a graph, then σ(Gn, r, k) ≤ σ(G, r, k).
Proof. Let s = σ(G, r, k).We show thatG(Gn, r, s, k) is awin for the spies. Let R0 be the initial position of the revolutionaries.
The spies play the position S0 from their winning strategy in G(G, r, s, k). If the revolutionaries move to a new position Rn in
Gn, then there are intermediate positions R1, . . . , Rn−1 such that Ri is one move from Ri−1 in G(G, r, s, k). Let S1, . . . , Sn be
the corresponding countermoves for the spies in their winning strategy in G(G, r, s, k). Since Sn is one move from S0 in Gn,
the spies may play Sn as their response to Rn in G(Gn, r, s, k) and the process repeats. This strategy indefinitely prevents a
meeting of size k. 
Theorem 2.4. If G and H are graphs, then
σ(G  H, r, k) ≥ max(σ (G, r, k), σ (H, r, k)).
Proof. When playing the game G(G  H, r, s, k), the revolutionaries can choose to play only in a single copy of G (or H).
Regardless of where the spies play, the revolutionaries can project the spies’ positions into the chosen copy of G. If the
revolutionaries can win G(G, r, s, k) against the projected spies, then they can win in GH . Thus σ(GH, r, s) ≥ σ(G, r, s).
The same argument works for H . Thus, the theorem follows. 
3. Proof of Theorem 1.4
As a warmup, we prove the following.
Theorem 3.1. If r and k are positive integers, then σ(Z, r, k) =  rk.
Proof. For 1 ≤ i ≤ r , let xi be the position of the ith revolutionary in Z and let x′i be its position one move later. Let
x(1) ≤ · · · ≤ x(r) be the order statistics of the sequence x, i.e. a rearrangement of the xi into non-decreasing order. Let
x′(1) ≤ · · · ≤ x′(r) be the order statistics of the sequence x′. Let s =
 r
k

. The spies’ strategy is to place the ith spy at position
yi = x(ik) for 1 ≤ i ≤ s. This clearly prevents an unguarded meeting of size k. If the spies are then able to move to the
positions y′i = x′(ik), this strategy will be sustainable.
It suffices to show that for all 1 ≤ i ≤ r, |x(i)−x′(i)| ≤ 1. If x(i) = x0, then there are at least i revolutionaries on integers less
than or equal to x0. After onemove, these same i revolutionaries are onpositions x0+1 or less,meaning x′(i) ≤ x0+1 = x(i)+1.
Similarly x(i) ≤ x′(i) + 1. 
Recall that a, b ∈ Zd are adjacent if and only a ≠ b and |ai − bi| ≤ 1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ d.
Lemma 3.2. If r and k are positive integers with 1 ≤ k ≤ r/2, then σ(Zd, r, k) ≤ r − 2k+ 2.
Proof. Clearly σ(Zd, 2k − 1, k) ≥ 1. We give a strategy for the spies showing that σ(Zd, 2k − 1, k) = 1. Suppose the
revolutionaries are in some position. Fix 1 ≤ i ≤ d. Let xi,1, . . . , xi,2k−1 be the ith coordinates of the revolutionaries. Let
ci = xi,(k) be their kth order statistic. The spies’ response is to move the spy to the vertex c = (c1, . . . , cd). By the argument
in Theorem 3.1, this is a playable strategy for the spies. Furthermore, it guards all meetings of size k or more. Lemma 2.1
implies σ(Zd, r, k) ≤ σ(Zd, r − 2k+ 1, 1)+ σ(Zd, 2k− 1, k) ≤ (r − 2k+ 1)+ 1 = r − 2k+ 2. 
Theorem 1.4 will follow from this next theorem (see Corollary 3.4).
Theorem 3.3. We have σ(Z2, 8, 2) = 6.
Proof. By Lemma 3.2, σ(Z2, 8, 2) ≤ 6. To complete the proof, we give a winning strategy for the revolutionaries in
G(Z2, 8, 5, 2). In the first round, the revolutionaries place their agents on the eight positions (±1,±1) and (±3,±3) (see
Fig. 1). In all of our figures the center point is position (0, 0), and each X represents a revolutionary while each O represents
a spy. If two revolutionaries may reach a vertex in n rounds, then there must be a spy within distance n of v to guard that
potential meeting. We often describe this by saying that a spy must guard a meeting at v in n rounds.
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Fig. 1. The revolutionaries’ initial position, the boxes Bi , and wedgesWi .
Claim 1 (Box Property). One or more spies must begin in each of the four boxes [1, 3] × [1, 3], [1, 3] × [−3,−1], [−3,−1] ×
[−3,−1], [−3,−1] × [1, 3]; we call these boxes B1, B2, B3, and B4 respectively (see Fig. 1).
By symmetry, we consider B1. The revolutionaries at (3, 3) and (1, 1)may form ameeting at (2, 2) in one round; at least
one spy must be in B1 to guard this meeting.
Let W1 be the ‘‘wedge’’ of points W1 = {(x, y) : y ≥ 1, y ≥ |x|}. We also consider the wedges obtained from W1 by
reflections in the lines y = x and y = −x; in clockwise order fromW1, we call theseW2,W3, andW4 (see Fig. 1).
Claim 2 (Wedge Property). There must be at least two spies present in W1; furthermore one of those spies must be distance 1
from (0, 2) and another distinct spy must be at distance 3 from (0, 6). We call this the wedge property for W1. By symmetry
(reflections through the lines y = x and y = −x), analogous wedge properties hold for W2,W3, and W4.
By symmetry we considerW1. The revolutionaries at (−1, 1) and (1, 1) can form a meeting in one round at (0, 2)while,
simultaneously, the revolutionaries at (−3, 3) and (3, 3) can form a meeting at (0, 6) in three rounds. Unless two spies are
located as described, one of these meetings will be uncovered.
By symmetry and the pigeonhole principle, we may assume that at least two spies, s′1 and s
′′
1 , have positions (x, y) with
x ≥ 0 and y ≥ 0. In fact, we may assume that there are exactly two such spies, since each of the boxes B2, B3, and B4 must
contain a spy; we call those spies s2, s3, and s4 respectively. Since the wedge property holds forW3 andW4, spy s3 must lie
in both wedges; furthermore its position must be either (−3,−3) or (−1,−1). This leads to the two cases below.
Case 1: s3 is at(−3,−3)
The following discussion is illustrated in Fig. 2. Since s3 is at (−3,−3), the wedge property for W4 implies that s4 is in
[−3,−1] × {1}. Similarly, s2 is in {1} × [−3,−1]. Furthermore, s′1 must be in [0, 1] × [0, 1] to guard against a meeting at
(0, 0) by the revolutionaries at (−1,−1) and (1, 1); neither s2 nor s4 can guard (0, 0), since they must guard against the
meetings at (2,−2) and (−2, 2). Given these restrictions on s′1, s2, and s4, the wedge properties for W1 and W2 imply that
s′′1 must be at (3, 3).
Suppose that the revolutionaries at (−1, 1) and (−1,−1) form a meeting at (−2, 0) and those from (−3, 3) and (1, 1)
form a meeting at (−1, 3). Let (x, y) be the position of s′1. We must have y ≥ 1 because, since spy s4 must guard (−2, 0), s′1
must guard (−1, 3). By symmetry, x ≥ 1. Thus s′1 is at (1, 1). Now s4 must be in [−2,−1] × {1} to guard against a meeting
at (−1, 0) of revolutionaries from (−1, 1) and (−1,−1). Similarly s2 must be in {1} × [−2,−1].
We also must have s4 = (−1, 1) or s2 = (1,−1). If not, then the revolutionaries at (−1, 1) and (−1,−1) can meet at
(0, 0), while the revolutionaries at (1, 1) and (1,−1) can meet at (2, 0). It will not be possible for the spies to guard both
meetings. By symmetry we may assume s4 = (−1, 1).
Thus at the beginning of round 1, we may assume that the spies and revolutionaries are located as in Fig. 3. This figure
indicates that s2 is located somewhere in R2 = {1} × [−2,−1]. The revolutionaries’ strategy is to move the revolutionary
at (−1,−1) to (−2,−2) and the one at (−1, 1) to (0, 0), while keeping the other revolutionaries in place.
We now analyze the positions that the spies must take at the end of round 1; see Fig. 4. The spies must keep the spies
at (3, 3) and (−3, 3) fixed to continue guarding meetings at (±6, 0) and (0,±6). Besides these two spies, only the spy in
R2 (and only if it were located at (1,−2)) could be moved to help guard (0,−6), but that spy cannot assist, as it must also
guard the meeting of the revolutionaries at (−2,−2) and (1,−1) at the point (0,−3).
Let (a, b) be the position of the spy in R2 in round 0, and let (a′, b′) be its position in round 1. We have a′ = 1, since
this spy must guard (2,−2) and also the meeting of (−2,−2) and (1,−1) at (−1,−3). We must have b′ ≤ −2, since this
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Fig. 2. Case 1.
Fig. 3. Case 1: at the end of round 0.
spy must guard the meeting of the revolutionaries at (−2,−2) and (3,−3) at (1,−5). Thus, the spies must have a spy in
R′2 = {1} × [−3,−2] at the end of round 1. (See Fig. 4.)
The spy located originally at (1, 1) cannot decrease its x-coordinate, because it must guard (2, 0). This forces the spy
originally located at (−1, 1) to decrease its y-coordinate to guard (−1,−1). This same spy must also decrease its x-
coordinate to guard against the meeting of the revolutionaries from (−3, 3) and (−2,−2) at (−5, 1). This forces the spy
at (1, 1) to move to (1, 0) to guard meetings at (2, 0), (0, 1), and (0,−1). Note that the spy in R′2 cannot help guard these,
since it independently must guard the meeting at (1,−5) by revolutionaries from (−2,−2) and (3,−3).
Now the revolutionaries at (−3, 3) and (1, 1) can form an unguarded meeting at (−1, 3) in 2 moves; see Fig. 4.
Case 2: s3 is at(−1,−1)
Since s3 is at (−1,−1) the wedge property implies that s2 is in [1, 3] × {−3} and s4 is in {−3} × [1, 3]. If s2 is at (3,−3)
and s4 is at (−3, 3), then the revolutionaries from (−1, 1) and (−1,−1) can form a meeting at (−2, 0), which must be
guarded by s3. Simultaneously, the revolutionaries at (1,−1) and (−3,−3) can form a meeting at (−1,−3), which will be
unguarded (see Fig. 5).
Without loss of generality, suppose instead that s2 is not at (3,−3). By the wedge property forW2, we must have s′1 is in[1, 3] × [0, 1] and s′′1 is in [3, 9] × [0, 3]. (See Fig. 6.) In fact, s′1 must be at (1, 1) in order to guard the meeting at (0, 2). Now
the revolutionaries at (−1,−1) and (1,−1) can form ameeting at (0,−1). This must be guarded by s3. Simultaneously, the
revolutionaries at (−1, 1) and (−3,−3) can form ameeting at (−3,−1) in two rounds; it can only be guarded if s4 began at
D. Howard, C. Smyth / Discrete Mathematics 312 (2012) 3384–3391 3389
Fig. 4. Case 1: at the end of round 1.
Fig. 5. Case 2: at the end of round 0, Part 1.
(−3, 1). By symmetry s2 must begin at (1,−3). Since now s′′1 must guard the meeting at (0, 6), it must be located at (3, 3);
see Fig. 6.
Thus at the end of round 0, the spies and revolutionaries are positioned as in Fig. 7.
The revolutionaries’ strategy is to move the revolutionary at (−1, 1) to (0, 0) and the one at (1, 1) to (2, 1)while leaving
all other revolutionaries unchanged. Fig. 8 illustrates how the spies must be located at the end of round 1 in order to
compensate. The spies must leave the spy at (3, 3) in place to guard (6, 0) and (0, 6). At the end of its move, the spy at
(−3, 1)must be somewhere in L4 = [−4,−3] × [0, 2] as it must guard (−6, 0). Similarly, the spy at (1,−3)must remain
in L2 = [0, 2] × [−4,−3].
The spy at (−1,−1)must stay in place to guardmeetings at (−2,−2) and (0, 0) in onemove. (Note: the spy at (−1,−1)
must guard (0, 0), since the spy at (1, 1) must guard against the potential meeting of the revolutionaries from (2, 1) and
(1,−1) at the point (2, 0).) Spy s′1 must move to (1, 0) to protect against meetings (0,−1), (1, 1), (2, 1) in the next round.
Spy s3 cannot help, since it must protect (−2,−2); see Fig. 8.
The revolutionaries’ strategy at the beginning of round 2 is to simultaneously move revolutionaries (0, 0) and (−1,−1)
to (−1, 0), revolutionaries (1,−1) and (−3,−3) to (−1,−3), and revolutionaries (2, 1) and (3,−3) to (4,−1). Only the
spy at (−1,−1) can guard the first meeting, and consequently only the spy in L2 can guard either of the other twomeetings.
Thus the revolutionaries win. 
Corollary 3.4. Theorem 3.3 implies Theorem 1.4.
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Fig. 6. Case 2: at the end of round 0, Part 2.
Fig. 7. Case 2: at the end of round 0, Part 3.
Proof. The winning strategy for the revolutionaries in G(Z2, 8, 5, 2) given in Theorem 3.3 does not involve movement of
the revolutionaries outside of the box [−6, 6]2 and takes no more than 5 moves to achieve a meeting of size 2. Thus a spy
outside the box [−11, 11]2 cannot help prevent a meeting of size 2.
We play many independent copies of this game to show that the revolutionaries have a winning strategy in
G

Z2, r, 6
 r
8
− 1, 2. For each iwith 1 ≤ i ≤  r8, eight revolutionaries are placed at positions (30i, 0)+ (±1,±1) and
(30i, 0)+ (±3,±3). The spies must place at most five spies in some box (30i, 0)+[−11, 11]2, and the revolutionaries then
canplay there according to theirwinning strategy inG(Z2, 8, 5, 2) to achieve ameeting of size 2. Thusσ(Z2, r, 2) ≥ 6  r8.
By Theorem 2.4, σ(Zd, r, 2) ≥ σ(Z2, r, 2) ≥ 6  r8 for d ≥ 2. 
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Fig. 8. Case 2: at the end of round 1.
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